With an evolution and modernization of global technologies, the dynamics of politics is also ever evolving. Novel security threats are emerging and even environment taking stage a non-tradition treat is also made part of political apparatuses. Similarly, ‘hydro-politics’ is the term which revolves on states methodically investigating interstate conflict or cooperation over transboundary water resources. According to the research done by Stratheia; the methodical study on the interaction among govern-ments, non-state actors, and a host of other par-ticipants—including those inside or outside the state—on authority distribution and use of national and international waterways.
In South Asia and more specifically in hydro politics between Pakistan and India, Hydro-Politics can be understood through a combination of the definitions of ‘hydro-politics’. Politicization of water through states as sole actors in either sharing or disputing over the natural resource or the involvement of for-eign mediators on the distribution and use of the resource. The case in point is to discuss India’s role in resolving disputes over shared international waters or becoming an aggressor in this bilateral hydro-politics.
For over half a century, rivalry over river resources has been a source of interstate tension between India and Pakistan. In 1947, during the partition of British India and the establishment of the two states, border lines were delineated based on what was referred to as the “Indus watershed”, a Cambridge article on Imperial geography of India notes. The arrangement of the lines allowed India to take control of upstream barrages, thereby managing the water flow into Pakistan. The delineation of the boundary between India and Pakistan intersects numerous tributaries of the river, giving rise to a power dynamic characterized by upstream and downstream interests.
This structure has fostered tensions between the two nations, especially regarding dam initiatives within Indian-administered regions. As a result of the lack of effective water management evolved into inter-state conflicts emerged among the newly independent nations. Moreover, the existing power imbalance has also become a political challenge in shaping the dynamics of water interactions within the shared Indus Basin.
The vast Indus river system is fed by glaciers and rivers that originate in the high highlands of the Himalayas, the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan, the Karakoram, and the Ngari Prefecture in western Tibet. The floodplain, which hosts a significant portion of Pakistan’s populace, stands as one of the most extensive agricultural areas in Asia. Approximately 90% of Pakistan’s food supply and 65% of its employment are reliant on agriculture and animal husbandry, as noted by climate diplomacy, both of which are supported by the Indus River. The Indus River system is predominantly divided between India, which accounts for 39%, and Pakistan, which comprises 47%, with minor portions located in Tibet and eastern Afghanistan. In the mountainous regions, the trajectories of its tributaries significantly influenced the establishment and dispute surrounding the “Line of Control” (LOC), a territorial demarcation dividing Indian and Pakistani lands. A multitude of tributaries traverse and border the Line of Control, delineating the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir from the Pakistani-administered territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. Thus, the excessive consumption of limited water resources, along with shifting demographics and water shortages driven by climate change, represent significant challenges confronting the Indus basin region. It possesses the potential to influence the future trajectory of the conflict as a result. A deeper understanding of the transboundary water conflict can be achieved by examining factors beyond natural characteristics. India, as the upper riparian, strategically utilizes water resources, while Pakistan, positioned as the lower riparian, must enhance its capabilities to address water-related challenges posed by India.
Even after British India was partitioned, it took thirteen years to establish a diplomatic solution to water resource disputes. The World Bank supported the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) as an equitable distribution of Indus water. Pakistan had exclusive rights over the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. The Indus River basin water management and distribution pact is crucial. Before entering Pakistan, India had exclusive access to the Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej rivers.
This agreement gave Pakistan 80% of the Indus and India 20%. Importantly, the pact has steadily pushed India to employ IWT as an instrument of hydro-hegemony in its strategy toward Pakistan.
Numerous aspects of the IWT have come under critical review in the decades since its ratification. Scholars and policy analysts have consistently identified three major issues that have exacerbated tensions between India and Pakistan. First, India’s extensive river development projects have led to an imbalanced irrigation system in Pakistan, weakening its agrarian economy and increasing its dependency on erratic water supplies (Ahmad, 2016). Second, irregular flow in the eastern rivers—a result of upstream control by India—has intensified the hydro-political conflict. The tributaries of rivers like the Ravi and Beas, which flow into Pakistani territory, have suffered significant desiccation, creating severe water shortages during critical agricultural seasons (Mustafa, 2010). Third, the construction of storage reservoirs poses long-term strategic and environmental challenges. These reservoirs, while presented as part of hydroelectric infrastructure, often shorten the lifespan of natural water systems and are susceptible to politicization, particularly in transboundary contexts (Gleick, 2014). Together, these issues highlight the treaty’s limitations in ensuring equitable and conflict-free water governance in the Indus basin.
Thus, critical analyses by various Pakistani scholars and policy experts suggest that the IWT, while framed as a cooperative mechanism, structurally favors India’s position as the upper riparian state. The treaty’s implementation has enabled India to pursue expansive hydraulic infrastructure projects, enhancing its strategic leverage over water flow into Pakistan. This dynamic has reinforced perceptions of hydro-hegemony, wherein geographical and technical advantages are used to assert political dominance in transboundary water management.
The Indus Waters conflict between India and Pakistan exemplifies how shared water resources can become instruments of geopolitical strategy. India’s approach of hydro-hegemony is typically consolidated through a combination of economic, military, and soft power, as well as control over water infrastructure and regulatory mechanisms. In the Indus Basin, India’s upper riparian position allows it to shape water flows and influence regional politics. By advancing dam construction and water diversion projects, India is attempting to shape the region’s hydro-political governance.
The Baglihar dam is key to this war, representing India’s unwavering ambition to dominate shared water resources and enslave neighboring states. Pakistani authorities express valid apprehensions about the design and building of the Baglihar project, citing breaches of the IWT. The dam’s significant elevation and extensive storage capacity are beyond the criteria for a “run-of-the-river” project, reflecting India’s overt violation of the treaty’s stipulations. Moreover, the existence of several power intake tunnels and controlled spillways further consolidates India’s capacity to regulate water flow, hence presenting a direct danger to Pakistan’s water security.
Moreover, politically analyzing such projects aligns with the original intent of the IWT, which was established to avert water-related conflicts. Consequently, it is India’s obligation to address their concerns, even if it hinders the execution of their projects. Nonetheless, the disputes have demonstrated that the hydro-hegemon prioritizes its national interests over those of the area.
Escalating environmental pressures, demographic shifts, and climate change-induced water variability are intensifying political disputes and exacerbating inequalities across the Indus Basin. These realities underscore the need to revise the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) to align with present-day challenges. While the treaty has historically served as a stabilizing force in the region, its structural limitations call for strengthening through updated protocols rather than abandonment.
The weaponization of water—evident in the politicized control and diversion of shared rivers—poses a serious threat to regional stability.
As a rising economic power and responsible global actor, India has an obligation to uphold international norms governing shared water resources. Its unilateral decisions to reinterpret or sideline treaty obligations not only erode trust but also undermine the foundation of hydro-diplomacy in South Asia.
The writer can be contacted at ridaanwaar3@gmail.com
